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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 920566-CA
Priority No. 2

HENRY LEE,
Defendant/Appellant

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States
provides
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses,
papers,
and
effects,
against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

Article

I, section 14 of the Constitution

of Utah

provides:
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden--Issuance of
warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses,
papers,
and
effects,
against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or
things to be seized.

Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-10(2) provides:
Force used in executing warrant -- Notice of authority
prerequisite, when.
When a search warrant has been issued
authorizing entry into any building, room, conveyance,
compartment or other enclosure, the officer executing the

warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to
enter:
(2) Without notice of his authority and
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the warrant directs in
the warrant that the officer need not give notice. The
magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, under oath,
that the object of the search may be quickly disposed of,
or secreted, or that physical harm may result to any
person if notice were given.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE POLICE SHOULD NOT BE ACCORDED
BLIND DEFERENCE WHEN DETERMINING WHETHER
"NO-KNOCK" ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT
IS APPROPRIATE.
(Responding to Point I.A of Appellee's Brief)
The State asks that the police be given almost unlimited
deference

in determining

warrants.

This deference is unwarranted.

article

I,

section

14

the best

require

method

that

of

executing

search

The fourth amendment and
searches

be

reasonable.

Implicit in such reasonableness is the understanding that excessive
force

will

not

be

utilized

in

executing

a

search

warrant.

"Unquestionably, notice is ordinarily required as a prerequisite to
the gaining of entry by physical force."
Seizure § 4.8(b) at 273

(2d ed. 1987)

2 LaFave, Search and

(citing Miller v. United

States, 357 U.S. 301, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958)).
Citing

the

state

constitutional

right

to bear

arms,

Article I, section 6, the State notes that "[t]he likelihood of
violence upon an unconsented home entry, especially where criminal
activity is already suspected, is therefore very real."
Brief at 10.

Mr. Lee agrees.

Appellee's

That's why we should knock rather
2

than break down someone's door.

We knock so people are less

alarmed, less likely to start shooting, and less likely to injure
or kill people.

See State v. Piller, 628 P. 2d 976

(Ariz. App.

1981), where the court held it was not enough that officers knew
that the defendant:
had negotiated for the purchase of a .357 magnum handgun
and that there was a possibility of such a weapon being
in the residence.
Police knowledge of existence of a
firearm excuses compliance with announcement requirements
only where the officers reasonably believe the weapon
will be used against them if they proceed with the
ordinary announcement, and this belief must be based on
specific
facts
and
not
on
broad,
unsupported
presumptions.
Id. at 979.
[T] he need
for compliance with the
knock-notice
requirements is stronger where the police had knowledge
of the presence of a weapon in the house and there is
nothing to suggest that the occupants have a propensity
to use the weapon against them, because there is more
danger of a deadly encounter if the householder is
startled by an unexpected intruder.
Id.

Fundamental constitutional rights, rather than the "'self-

destructive officer' premise" asserted by the State, are the bases
of the holdings by the courts in Piller and People v. Dumas, 512
P.2d 1208, 1213 (Cal. 1973).

The police are understandably more

concerned for their own safety than they are for the rights of
others to safety and to be free from unreasonable searches.

If

police safety was the only relevant concern, the police could argue
that

it

is preferable

to kill

the persons

subject

to

warrants and thereby conduct searches in complete safety.

search
We must

also concern ourselves with the safety of the subjects of searches,
and also the safety of innocent bystanders who may be located in or
3

near the premises.

Fortunately, this country has an independent

judiciary to protect the constitutional rights of all its citizens,
and prevent imposition of a police state.
The police are seeking to use no-knock warrants more and
more frequently.

See, e.g. State v. Thurman, 2 03 Utah Adv. Rep. 18

(Utah 1993) (police sought no-knock, day or night authorization;
magistrate only authorized daytime, knock and announce execution;
police executed warrant in no-knock manner anyway).

Television is

replete with show after show where the police break down the door
to "get the bad guys."

People are getting injured and killed.

Courts should be wary of creating a per se rule allowing no-knock
warrants

in

drug

cases.1

The

trial

court

in

this

case

was

justifiably concerned that such a rule is not far off when he asked
the prosecutor:
THE COURT:
Is it your position that in any
drug search -- well, maybe that's going too far. But in
almost every drug search, the evidence is rather small
and easily concealed or disposed of. Are you saying that
in any of those that a no-knock is justified?
R. 141, lines 13-18.
The Supreme Court has recently set forth the purpose of
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10:2
igee, e.g., Appellee's Brief at 12: "A home that is to be
entered pursuant to a probable cause finding is presumptively
'hostile.' Therefore, even uncertain evidence that the occupants
were armed formed a sufficient basis to authorize searching
officers to take precautions.
2

Although in Thurman, no-knock entry was not authorized, the
evils that the knock-and-announce rule seeks to avoid are amply
demonstrated.
In this case, there was no compelling need to
execute the warrant on a no-knock basis, and no-knock authorization
should have been denied.
4

The Utah knock-and-announce statute obviously
anticipates that the occupant of the target residence
will have the opportunity to answer the door, thus
maintaining some control over his or her abode and
keeping the encounter with the police on a civil basis.
Nothing in the facts suggests that if the agents had
complied with the statute, Thurman would not have
awakened, dressed, and answered the door. Rather than
allowing Thurman to retain some control over the
encounter, six agents burst into his small apartment with
weapons drawn, routed him out of bed, handcuffed him
behind the back while he was naked (somehow producing a
bloody nose in the process), and commenced the search.
Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26-7 (cite omitted) .

Before the

judiciary should blindly follow what the police in their discretion
believe to be the best course, the police should prove that they
are worthy of such deference.

Cases such as Thurman show that the

police are not worthy of the degree of deference the State now
seeks.
At page 9 of its brief, the State cites Dalia v. United
States, 441 U.S. 238, 257, 99 S.Ct. 1682, 1693, 60 L.Ed.2d 177, 192
(1979)

for

its

statement

that

"it

is generally

left

to

the

discretion of the executing officers to determine the details of
how best to proceed with the performance of a search authorized by
warrant

-- subject

protection

of

course

to the general

Fourth Amendment

'against unreasonable searches and seizures.'"

dissent in Dalia is also worthy of scrutiny:
"It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest
and least repulsive form:
but illegitimate and
unconstitutional practices get their first footing in
that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight
deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only
be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional
provisions for the security of person and property should
be liberally construed. A close and literal construction
deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to
gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted
5

The

more in sound than in substance.
It is the duty of
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of
the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon."
Id. , 441 U.S. at 262, 99 S.Ct. at

, 60 L.Ed.2d at 195-6 (quoting

Bovd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746
(1886) . The constitutional right to be free from having one's door
broken down currently exists "more in sound than in substance."

POINT II. PERSONS SUSPECTED OF DRUG DEALING
UPON A PROBABLE CAUSE FINDING RETAIN THE
SAME SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROTECTIONS AS DO
ORDINARY CITIZENS.
(Responding to Point I.B. of Appellee's Brief)
The United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution
apply to all the citizens of Utah equally.

A person does not check

his or her constitutional rights at the door merely because he or
she has been accused or is suspected of some criminal conduct.
State cites no authority to the contrary.

The

Merely because there has

been a finding of probable cause does not mean that the suspect has
no right to be free from unannounced entry.

The Utah legislature

has required that a particularized showing of necessity be made
before an unannounced entry is authorized by enacting Utah Code
Ann. § 77-23-10(2).

Mr. Lee argues that the Fourth Amendment and

Article I, section 14 require no less.
17-19.

See Appellant's Brief at

Cf. State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 21 (Utah 1993)

(declining

to decide whether violation of

the Utah knock

and

announce statute is also a violation of the fourth amendment) . The
State is arguing for something akin to a per se rule.
6

State
inapposite.

v.

Gardiner,

814

P.2d

568

(Utah

1991)

is

The State correctly notes that citizens have no right

to forcibly resist even an unlawful search, but nobody has alleged
that there was any resistance here.

The question here is not

whether there is a right to resist; the question at issue is
whether the police may break down the door unannounced.

Excessive

force utilized in the execution of a search warrant renders the
search unreasonable.
(manner

of

entry

State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 703 (Utah 1988)

would

be

unreasonable

if

appreciably to the invasion of privacy").

it

"contribute[d]

The exclusionary rule

renders the evidence seized inadmissible.

POINT

III.
VIOLATION OF THE "NO-KNOCK"
STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-10(2),
REQUIRES THAT THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED BE
EXCLUDED.

(Responding to Point I.C. of Appellee's Brief)
The state assails Mr. Lee's reference to State v. Rowe,
806 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 196 Utah
Adv.

Rep.

14

proposition

(Utah,

September

that violation

of

28,
the

exclusion of the evidence obtained.

1992)

in

"no-knock"

support
statute

of

the

requires

Rather than being a mere

"nominal allusion," Appellee's Brief at 15, Mr. Lee has fully set
forth the basis of his position.
The state asserts that Rowe was overruled on precisely
the point for which it was cited by Mr. Lee.

This is not so.

Although counsel did not carefully set forth the refinements the
Supreme Court put on the Court of Appeal's decision in Rowe, the
7

proposition of law as stated is correct.

The Court of Appeals in

Rowe held that violation of a statute establishing procedures for
protecting substantive rights requires suppression.

The Court of

Appeals also noted that "mere ministerial and technical errors in
the preparation or execution of search warrants will not, without
more, invalidate the warrant."

Id. at 738 (citing State v. Buck,

756 P. 2d 700, 702-3 (Utah 1988) (violation of "knock-and-announce"
rule did not require suppression when no one was at home at the
time of the search to respond to the knock)).
Supreme

Court

statement

In overruling, the

focused on the facts, not the Court of Appeals

of the law.

The Supreme Court restated

the law as

follows:
"Only a 'fundamental violation of [a rule of
criminal procedure] requires automatic suppression, and
a violation is 'fundamental' only where it, in effect,
renders the search unconstitutional under traditional
fourth amendment standards. Where the alleged violation
. . . is not 'fundamental' suppression is required only
where:
(1) there was 'prejudice' in the sense that the
search might not have occurred or would not have been so
abrasive if the [r]ule had been followed, or (2) there
is evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard of a
provision of the [r]ule. . . .
It is only where the violation also
implicates fundamental, constitutional concerns, is
conducted in bad-faith or has substantially prejudiced
the defendant that exclusion may be an appropriate
remedy.
Rowe, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15 (quoting State v. Fixei, 744 P.2d
1366, 1369 (Utah 1987)).
The Supreme Court next addressed the critical facts that
were determinative. "Defendant has not argued that there were no
substantive grounds for a nighttime, no-knock warrant.

She merely

argues that the affidavit supporting the application for a warrant
8
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Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court in Rowe mandates the same
result:

the evidence seized must be suppressed.

POINT IV. THE OFFICERS' LACK OF GOOD FAITH IS
CLEAR FROM THE RECORD CURRENTLY BEFORE
THIS COURT, AND NO REMAND TO DETERMINE
POSSIBLE GOOD FAITH IS NECESSARY.
(Responding to Point I.D. of Appellee's Brief)
The

state

failed

to

raise

the

federal

"good

faith

exception" below, and has therefore waived its right to assert its
applicability.

Cf. State v. Marshall, 791 P. 2d 880, 885

(Utah

App.) (state may not raise the issue of standing for the first time
on appeal), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105

(Utah 1990).

Mr. Lee

briefed the issue to ensure that this Court did not sua sponte rely
on the federal "good faith exception" to uphold the validity of the
search in this case.

The state should be precluded from making

such arguments now.
At page 16 of Appellee's Brief, the state argues that
should this Court determine that the search pursuant to the warrant
was invalid, this matter should be remanded for a determination of
possible good faith.

As fully set forth in Appellant's Brief in

Point I.B. at pp. 19-23, the good faith exception does not apply in
this case.

"Officer Bassi, as affiant, detainer of Dowell, and

executor of the warrant, had knowledge at the time of execution
that Dowell was in custody."

Lack of good faith is apparent on the

record, and remand would only serve to waste additional judicial
resources.

10
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POINT V. UTAH APPELLATE COURTS HAVE N O T Y E T
APPLIED
THE
"TOTALITY
OF
THE
CIRCUMSTANCES" TEST TO SEARCH WARRANTS
UNDER ARTICLE I SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
(Responding to Point III of Appellee's Brief
at p . 23 n.7)
3

Perhaps the state's i eluctance to bri ef this :i ssi ie
unrelated to the merits of its argument.
11

i s iI : •t

The state cites State v. Miller. 740 P.2d

1363, 1365

(Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987) as an example
of a situation where this Court has applied the "totality of the
circumstances test" to search warrants under Article I section 14
of the Utah constitution.

The state mis-reads Miller.

The opinion

!l

states

[t]he fourth amendment to the United States Constitution

and article one, section fourteen of the Utah Constitution both
require

a

finding

of

'probable

cause

supported

affirmation' prior to issuance of a search warrant."

by

oath

or

Id. at 1365.

The opinion then discusses the federal test under Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).
point does the Miller opinion address the appropriate

At no

test to

determine whether an affidavit establishes probable cause under the
state

constitution,

or

address

separate

state

constitutional

arguments on any issue. The reference to article I section 14 thus
appears to be gratuitous.

This Court has implicitly recognized

that Miller was not decided under the state constitution in State
v. Avala, 762 P.2d

1107, 1109 and n.2

(Utah App. 1988), cert,

denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989), and State v. Dronebura, 781 P.2d
1303, 1304 and n.l (Utah App. 1989). 4

4

As in Miller, both Dronebura and Ayala mention section 14 in
conjunction with the fourth amendment, but fail to address whether
the state constitutional standard is different because the matter
was not briefed.
12

CONCLUSION
Mi:

Lee respectfully requests that this Court reverse the

trial couit s uiaei ut*~v:^;n M s motion Lu .".uppres.?
obtained

-* ^ t-*^ seal .. ^ ;

^

premises

• ;•

^he

-^ider^e

.. : ;.•_ -.^,JL. ; e^t- i

Evidence seiz-'i frcrr t v:e search of Mi: Lie*- sh-:\.id be suppressed a?.
I

i t i it i

'»

J
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